Simon Mohsin-
Russia-Ukraine conflict, the China-U.S. competition, and the East-West confrontation, and the Global North and South disparity of power has become increasingly prominent. For consolidating their camps and influence, both sides are vying to expand their respective network. BRICS is touted as a counterweight to the Group of Seven (G7) countries. Primarily, it aims to challenge Western dominance in the global economic system. Reportedly, about 40 countries had applied for BRICS membership; the forum was touting the introduction of a new common gold based currency to counter the global US Dollar hegemony. The group would have supposedly expanded to instigate restructuring and counterweighting the west dominated international order.
None of it happened, except the expansion, which also remained lamenting compared to the preceding interest and discourse regarding BRICS’ expansion. The six countries that have been inducted in the expanded BRICS+ underscores an interesting dynamic. It must be conceded that the outcome of the anticipated, coveted, and much discussed BRICS Summit is inadequate and insufficient to the hype the summit had rendered to its run-up.
The countries that have been made new members are selected based on very key and specific priorities. China and Russia have been trying to enhance influence in Africa; India, and Brazil, have also been trying to do the same to tap the economic and strategic potential of the India Ocean. Thus, Ethiopia, a key state in the Horn of Africa is an important inclusion. Ethiopia offers connectivity the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, and has high reserves of mineral resources. Argentina is key partner for influence in South America providing a strategic partner for global food and energy security. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE are key nodal countries in the Middle East providing energy resources, minerals, connectivity across various regions. They offer influence over the Gulf and Islamic nations; also, a counterbalance to the US, as the UAE and Saudi both have strategic relations with the US; as Iran has with Russia. Saudi has already began trading oil with China in exchange for Yuan, while UAE has agreed to do the same with India in exchange of rupees. So, although the US Dollar hegemony is not directly addressed, the BRICS countries and its new members are opting to circumvent the US Dollar dependence. However, this would take a plethora of additional financial infrastructural reforms and upgrades for the countries to do so effectively. Moreover, as Iran allows access to the Strait of Hormuz, so does Egypt to the Suez Canal, as well as to energy and other mineral resources.
With the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE and Egypt, one could argue that BRICS expansion is very Middle East centric. To be more precise, the expansion included countries that are nodal to each significant region as well as provide key energy, minerals, political, and global connectivity advantages, all of which are key for the developing economies of the original BRICS nations, as well as the new members. Thus, the choices for expansion are based on complementary interests.
It is clear from the BRICS discourse and speeches, statements, and analysis during the run-up and in the Summit that China and Russia were keen on expanding the group, as was South Africa, the host country that also wants to gain global political clout given its own ongoing domestic challenges. But, India and Brazil mostly became the bottlenecks. More notably, India again failed to live up to its boastful self-identity of the regional leader and big brother of South Asia. India as well as Brazil’s focus on “I only, and me first, then the rest” approach to global relations has held back the Global South and its aspirations for equal and equitable intervention in the global order.
The two countries are presently ruled by regimes, or individuals to be more precise, who pivot on populism and are hard pressed to deliver on economic promises to maintain their leadership gravitas and stature. India has made significant gains on this front with recent trade deals with the US. Earlier this year, meetings between Brazil’s Lula and US President Biden also indicate similar gains for Brazil in the months to come. Thus, Brazil and India, or Lula and Modi specifically, opted to focus on individual gains and interests rather than the larger and cumulative interests of the BRICS and the Global South, which looked eagerly towards BRICS to create a more balanced world order, countering the west, mainly the US hegemony. BRICS failed to deliver on that expectation this time. Individual interests and petty political aspirations trumped cumulative interests and expectations.
For Brazil, it definitely wants a bigger say in global affairs. In a five-member BRICS, it is a big fish in a relatively small pond. More members would likely diminish Brazil’s influence. Thus, rather than agreeing to expand the group extensively, Brazil only agreed to induct those nations that offer strategic and economic equitable partnerships, while retaining the soft power, economic strength, and regional and global integrity so that each of the new member retains its neutrality. Given Lula’s short and midterm objectives of acquiring economic benefits from the west, mainly the US, Brazil does not want to allow any new allies for China and Russia through the BRICS forum.
For India, the objective is same but with more zeal for achieving it. Indian media has reported extensively on why India is reluctant for BRICS’ rapid expansion. It is wary of the inclusion of new members who could gravitate towards a power centre and make the bloc more China-centric. India, under the PM Modi’s leadership continues view China as a regional threat. There is definitely some avenues, especially through BRICS, for India and China to reconcile many of the issues unresolved between them. Has China taken any effective initiative to reconcile, that remains unknown. But, neither has India and that is confirmed; rather, India has underscored its reluctance as reflected in BRICS expansion issue. It is worth pondering how it would affect Asia and the world if India and China reconcile. It is unlikely that we would see any such efforts in the near future.
PM Modi and the BJP has pivoted its political strategy on, among other issues, his persona, individual gravitas, and populism. Moisés Naím, former contributing editor at The Atlantic and author of the book “The End of Power” writes that populism is not an ideology. Instead, it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. Even though populist leaders and the countries they rule are vastly different, populism contains the same ingredients everywhere. The most successful populist leaders are masters at exacerbating socio-cultural division and conflict. They use differences in income, race, religion, region, nationality, or any other rift in society to drive a wedge between different groups and foment indignation and political outrage. Populists are not afraid to fuel social conflict—in fact, they thrive on it. An indispensable ingredient of the populist recipe is the “us” that embodies the nation, represented by the populist leader who promises to confront the “them,” who have allegedly harmed “the people.” Populists often treat those who oppose them not as fellow citizens with different views, but as traitors who don’t deserve to be heard or maintain their full political rights. For populists, it is not enough to create an internal enemy; they also need foreign enemies. This external threat can be a country—say, China or a group, like immigrants or Muslims.
Based on what Naim writes, who fits the bill? Many leaders across the globe and history would. As does PM Modi. PM Modi’s populist focus has hindered India from becoming the beacon and spokes agent for South Asia, and overall the Global South. India retains all the key ingredients, cultural sensitivities, economic fluctuation experiences, and experience of being dealt and addressed as an unequal in the west led global order. Its experiences, familiarities, and now acquired capabilities make it a potent force and effective voice to demand equal interaction, and equitable intervention rights for the Global South, mainly countries like Bangladesh and its other South Asian neighbors. However, PM Modi refused to allow India, again, to attain that role and stature in exchange for individual economic benefits and regional strategic advantages as offered by the US trade deals signed recently. PM Modi made the choice which from one viewpoint is understandable and also commendable. He opted confirmed benefits for his country that are on the table, rather than choose for potential collective benefits in the future. Depriving countries like Bangladesh and others the chance of collectively bargaining for more equal engagements and decision making, India, or PM Modi has remained within the US led world order, while doing a balancing act with BRICS nations.
Simon Mohsin is a Political and International Affairs Analyst
